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Abstract:  
Social contagion is a well-studied phenomenon in which people adopt beliefs that they 
are exposed to by their neighbors, and then pass those beliefs along to others. Research (and 
daily life) shows that people prefer to adopt beliefs that are consistent with those they already 
hold. However, scholars do not often account for interactions between beliefs in their models of 
social contagion. Instead, they assume that beliefs spread independently of one another. Is this 
a harmless simplification? Or does omitting interdependence between beliefs suppress 
important dynamics, and change the outcome of social contagion? This paper performs a head-
to-head comparison between independent and interdependent diffusion. Simulations identify 
two social processes that emerge when diffusants interact, and predict that as a result of 
interdependent diffusion, worldviews will emerge that are unconstrained by external truth, and 
polarization will develop in homogenous populations. A controlled laboratory experiment 
confirms these predictions with 2400 participants in 120 artificial social networks. I conclude that 
the assumption of independence between diffusants is not as universally appropriate as its 
ubiquity would suggest. Instead, interdependence between diffusants is likely to be both 
common and consequential.  
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Introduction:  
On June 18th, 2015, the U.S. Treasury announced that a portrait of a woman 
would appear on the ten-dollar bill. The same day, news emerged of a mass shooting at 
a historically black church in Charleston, South Carolina. Within twenty-four hours both 
stories had spread through the U.S. population, driven by broadcast news and social 
media. In working to understand the spread of news about the shooting, researchers 
would be justified in ignoring the news about the $10 bill, and vice versa. We can 
assume independence between these diffusants because the probability that an 
individual will choose to share one piece of news is not likely to be causally influenced 
by whether they have understood and shared the other.  
In the days that followed the shooting, two other news items emerged on social 
media. The first was a report that the Charleston shooter had been motivated by racial 
hatred, which he found symbolized in the Confederate flag. The second was a call to 
remove the Confederate flag from the South Carolina state capitol grounds (1). Even 
though these are distinct ideas, each spreading through a process of social contagion, 
we cannot ignore one in trying to understand the diffusion of the other. If an individual 
has previously adopted the belief that the flag should be removed from the capitol 
grounds, they will be more likely to believe that the shooter’s identification with the flag 
is politically relevant, and vice versa. Rather than being independent diffusants, these 
beliefs are interdependent.  
With good reason, the overwhelming majority of social contagion research over 
the last 50 years has assumed that diffusants spread independently of one another. 
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Independence is an extremely useful and generative simplification. By assuming that 
diffusants do not interact, we can study the effects of social network structure, 
homophily, social reinforcement, or demographics on each contagion process in 
isolation. We then linearly superimpose any additional contagion processes upon the 
first.  
The independence assumption makes it easier to develop and communicate 
theories of social contagion, and the most influential authors on social contagion use it 
to great effect. For example, when Granovetter showed that one’s distant 
acquaintances may provide more novel information than one’s close friends, he ignored 
how the receiver acquires the contextual knowledge needed to understand foreign 
information (2). Similarly, when he showed how individuals’ heterogeneous responses 
to peer pressure can shape cascades of collective action, he set aside the social 
contagion of tactics and political attitudes that accompany protest (3). When Schelling 
showed that even weak preferences for similar neighbors could lead to segregation, he 
measured “similarity” along a single dimension (4). When Watts highlighted the 
importance of local network structure for the initial germination of adoption cascades, he 
limited his model to one diffusant at a time (5).  When Burt showed that individuals who 
bridge a gap between strangers can benefit from brokering information between them, 
he assumed that all parties share enough common understanding to make the 
information transferable in the first place (6). When Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos 
worked out how to promote a belief to maximize its spread, they ignored the 
simultaneous spread of other beliefs in the network (7). As a final example, when 
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Centola and Macy developed the theory of complex contagion, they specified that social 
reinforcement of the same behavior was required for individuals to adopt a behavior, 
omitting the possibility that related behaviors may also support adoption (8). 
As with theoretical treatments, most empirical studies of social contagion have 
considered diffusants to be independent of one another. For example, Travers and 
Milgram’s use of chain letters to study social network structure may have reached 
different conclusions if individuals’ willingness to forward the letter had been influenced 
by other pieces of mail (9). Lorenz et al. (10) and Muchnik, Aral, and Taylor (11) showed 
that social influence undermined the “wisdom of crowds” effect when the crowd 
assessed one item at a time.  Rand, Arbesman, and Christakis (12) and Suri and Watts 
(13) showed that social network structure influenced the spread of cooperation, a single 
social behavior, and the list goes on. 
The independence assumption makes for parsimonious theory, and it reduces 
the complexity and expense of experiments. However, scholars of social contagion 
assume independence between diffusants so frequently and to such productive ends 
that we do not always make this assumption explicit. This is dangerous, in that readers 
– and occasionally authors – may not recognize that an assumption is being made.  
“Interdependent diffusion” describes any social contagion process in which 
individuals’ likelihood of adopting diffusant A is a function of their current state of 
adoption of B (C, D, …) and in which their likelihood of adopting B (C, D, …) is a 
function of their state of adoption of A. In the social contagion literature, only a few 
studies explicitly allow for this type of interaction between diffusants. Baldassari and 
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Bearman (14) and DellaPosta, Shi, and Macy (15) both explore interdependence that 
arises when individuals’ opinions and preferences serve to signal membership in a 
particular group. In their models, various preferences tend to become popular in 
different parts of the social network, and positions on political issues become associated 
with lifestyle choices. Friedkin et al. (16) and Goldberg and Stein (17) simulate 
interdependence that arises from logical interactions between diffusants to explore the 
emergence of polarization or consensus. While they do not explicitly compare 
independent and interdependent diffusion and have not tested their theories empirically, 
writers of this nascent literature (see also 18-20) suggest that scholars of social 
contagion should reassess the common assumption of independence between 
diffusants.  
This paper begins such a reassessment. How much does interdependence 
matter? In addressing this question, I argue that interdependence matters to scholars 
and practitioners if it 1) generates new sociological processes, 2) suggests new 
observable outcomes, and 3) has practical consequences for communication and social 
policy. If these results are not observed then the assumption of independence is 
sufficient. If they are observed, much work remains to understand how interdependence 
changes our understanding of social contagion. 
This paper uncovers two new sociological processes that are unique to 
interdependent diffusion and which cannot be reduced to the familiar influences of 
network structure, homophily, social reinforcement, or demographics. First, when 
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beliefs2 support one another’s adoption, they can “snowball” through a population to 
reach a broader audience than any could have reached on its own. Secondly, when 
individuals have similar belief sets, they are more likely to respond in the same way to 
new beliefs to which they are exposed, and so become yet more similar. 
Simulations in this paper predict that shared “worldviews” will emerge 
spontaneously from the process of interdependent diffusion. Specifically, subsets of a 
population will come to share a set of interconnected beliefs (and reject others that are 
equally available) without reference to any ground truth. Interdependent diffusion is also 
predicted to foment polarization by increasing similarity within ideological camps and 
difference between camps, and aligning the population along a “left-right” political axis.  
Finally, this paper reports an experimental test of the above predictions that 
involved 2400 participants in 120 artificial social networks. Each individual was given 
clues to a mystery and was asked to share any promising leads with their social network 
neighbors. After exchanging clues for eight minutes, they were asked to judge who 
performed the crime and how. The presented information was manipulated to create a 
world with strong interdependence between clues, and a comparison world in which the 
same clues were independent of each other. Unbeknownst to the participants, the 
mystery had no solution and the clues were perfectly symmetric and pretested to 
eliminate outside bias. Regardless, participants confidently surmised an answer, and in 
so doing confirmed the predicted emergence of worldviews and polarization. 
                                                        
2 Throughout this paper, I use the term “beliefs” to refer to ideas or statements of fact, rather than values or ideals. 
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While this paper cannot explore all of the implications of interdependent diffusion, 
it does highlight a few mechanisms that are of sufficient impact and relevance to make 
interdependence an unignorable aspect of social contagion. This paper reminds us that 
the assumption of independence between diffusants is just that – an assumption. 
Despite its ubiquity, the assumption should be made explicit when employed and 
challenged when necessary.  
Results: 
A Minimal Model of Interdependent Diffusion 
A very simple model can illustrate the effect of belief interaction on social 
contagion. In this model, individuals’ beliefs are represented using the “semantic 
network” abstraction borrowed from the cognitive science literature (21-24).  As shown 
in Fig. 1, nodes in a semantic network represent concepts such as people, places, or 
activities. A semantic network edge represents the belief that two concepts are 
connected in some way (e.g. the person visited the place). Beliefs interact when they 
both reference a particular node in the semantic network3.  
When an individual is exposed to a new belief by her neighbor in the social 
network, she decides whether to adopt it by seeing how it relates to beliefs in her 
existing semantic network. She is likely to adopt a belief connecting two concepts that 
are already close together in her semantic network, as it seems consistent with the 
beliefs she already holds (24, 25). Conversely, she is unlikely to adopt a belief that two 
                                                        
3Other models assume relationships such as “belief i is compatible with j, but not k”. Avoiding the need to pre-specify 
compatibility gives confidence that any systematic variation in adoption can be attributed to the diffusion process 
rather than to the assumed relationships. The importance of this is outlined in the supplement. 
 8 
 
distant concepts are connected, as doing so would dramatically reshape her belief 
structure. The simplest representation of this tendency is that a simulated individual will 
adopt any belief that her neighbors possess, as long as the existing distance in her 
semantic network is below some threshold. To make the simulation easy to follow, I use 
a threshold of 2 links distance, such that a belief will be permanently adopted if it closes 
a triangle in the adopter’s semantic network4.  
 
Fig. 1. A minimal model of interdependent diffusion 
 
                                                        
4 The results of the simulation are qualitatively similar with other thresholds or decision rules. 
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The Reciprocal Facilitation Mechanism 
To observe the first effect of interdependence on diffusion, we can follow a single 
focal belief as it spreads through the social network. The focal belief spreads when the 
prior beliefs of an exposed individual make her susceptible to the focal belief (i.e. in this 
simplified model the focal belief would “close a triangle” in her semantic network). 
Continuing to spread to other neighbors in the social network, the focal belief may then 
reciprocate that facilitation by creating conditions of susceptibility to the beliefs which 
had previously supported its diffusion, and repeat the cycle.  
Fig. 2 illustrates this mechanism of “reciprocal facilitation”, in which 
simultaneously-diffusing beliefs alternately create susceptibility to one another, and 
together are adopted by more individuals than any single belief could have reached by 
diffusing on its own. In this illustration, Juliet, Ken, and Lisa each begin with a different 
set of beliefs denoted as connections (AB, AC, …) between concepts: (A, B, C, …). At 
first, these individuals are not susceptible to adopting beliefs from one another, and so 
no diffusion can occur. Ken’s acquisition of belief BD in step 1 kicks off a cycle of 
reciprocal facilitation between BD and AD in steps 2-4. Without the introduction of belief 
BD, Lisa could never adopt AD, despite her prior susceptibility. Similarly, without AD 
she could not adopt BD, despite her prior exposure.  
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Fig. 2. The reciprocal facilitation mechanism. Beliefs (AB, AD, etc.) represent connections 
made between concepts (A, B, C, D, E) and spread when an exposed individual can close a 
triangle in their existing semantic network by adopting a belief. 
 
Returning to the earlier example, we can see reciprocal facilitation at work 
between beliefs about the confederate flag. The existing political conflict facilitated the 
spread of information about the shooter’s identification with the flag, and as it spread, 
news of the shooter’s identification brought more attention to the political conflict over 
the flag’s display at the state capitol.  
What are the effects of reciprocal facilitation at the macro level? Figure 3 shows 
the result of applying the “triangle closing” decision rule to a population of 60 agents in a 
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random social network5. The first effect of reciprocal facilitation is to allow the average 
number of susceptible and adopting individuals to grow simultaneously, as shown by 
the red logistic growth curves in Fig. 3A. As a comparison, in black, I show how the 
same beliefs would diffuse if they did not interact. In the independent case, beliefs may 
only be adopted by individuals who are susceptible at the start, and so beliefs spread 
less widely in the population. Put another way: to explain the same level of final 
adoption, models of independent diffusion need to assume significantly more initial 
susceptibility to each belief.  
It would be reasonable for us to ignore interdependence and instead assume 
more widespread initial susceptibility, were it not for the second effect of reciprocal 
facilitation. When diffusants do not interact, the population initially susceptible to a belief 
is an excellent predictor of the number who will eventually adopt it. However, Fig 3B 
shows that as susceptibility evolves alongside adoption in interdependent diffusion, the 
population that is initially susceptible to a belief becomes a poor predictor of who will 
eventually adopt it.  
To use a concrete example, imagine that a “focus group” is selected from our 
artificial population before the simulation starts, and imagine that amongst this group AB 
is adopted by 25% more people than CD. Unsurprisingly, when we simulate 
independent diffusion in the full population, AB turns out to be more popular than CD in 
over 99% of cases. On the other hand, when we simulate interdependent diffusion, AB 
                                                        
5 For details of the simulation, see the Methods section. 
 12 
 
is adopted by more people than CD only 57% of the time – just slightly better than 
chance. 
 
Fig. 3: The effect of reciprocal facilitation on emergent belief structures. 
The popularity of interdependent beliefs is hard to predict because reciprocal 
facilitation does not support the diffusion of all beliefs to the same degree. Instead, it 
preferentially amplifies those that are connected to other widely adopted beliefs. Figure 
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3C shows that a belief’s popularity becomes correlated with the popularity of the most 
popular belief adjacent to it. This is because a belief that is supported by many popular 
beliefs will have many opportunities to diffuse, and then to facilitate the adoption of 
other closely related beliefs. Conversely, a belief that is connected only to unpopular 
supporting beliefs will have trouble reaching even the few individuals who are 
susceptible to adopting it.  
As a result, patterns emerge when individual semantic networks are aggregated 
to the level of the population. After interdependent diffusion, the most popular beliefs 
are closely related to one another and form densely connected islands in the semantic 
space. Fig. 3D shows one of many possible measures of this structure, the clustering 
coefficient (see the methods section for others). In everyday language, we might call 
these clusters of interacting beliefs “worldviews”. Shared by large segments of the 
population, these self-reinforcing sets of beliefs have a strong influence on which new 
beliefs can be adopted. While clustering is a consistent outcome of interdependent 
diffusion, the process itself is strongly path-dependent, and so the precise locations of 
the clusters (the worldviews that emerge) are unpredictable.  
This simulation suggests that clustering does not occur because some beliefs are 
inherently more compatible with one another, but because the most popular beliefs 
bring popularity to their neighbors. In contrast, independently diffusing beliefs can only 
exhibit this kind of macro-level structure if it is assumed to be present in individuals’ 
initial susceptibility to beliefs. Doing so merely defers explanation to another exogenous 
phenomenon. 
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The Agreement Cascade Mechanism 
To explain a second mechanism of interdependent diffusion, we can observe a 
pair of neighbors in the social network. When these two individuals exchange beliefs, 
they become more similar to one another. Because their existing belief sets influence 
the way they respond to new beliefs, shared beliefs make the two individuals more likely 
to adopt (or reject) the same new beliefs in the future, regardless of any preference to 
align or distinguish themselves from one another. As a result, they become more similar 
still. Additionally, similar neighbors expand one another’s access to beliefs that the two 
may adopt in common, and filter each other’s exposure to beliefs that would set them 
apart from one another. In contrast, individuals who adopt differing beliefs are likely to 
diverge further as their dissimilar semantic networks make them susceptible to different 
beliefs.  
Fig. 4 illustrates this “agreement cascade” mechanism, in which exchanging 
beliefs creates further opportunities for similarity to develop between individuals. In this 
example, Mike, Nina, and Otis share two out of their three beliefs with their neighbors 
(AD and DE), and so their belief sets are positively correlated at 0.42. When Nina and 
Otis exchange beliefs in step 1, they not only make themselves more similar in the act, 
but they also set themselves up for congruent behavior in the future. Their response to 
externally supplied beliefs in step 2 further reinforces their similarity with one another 
and amplifies their emerging dissimilarity with Mike. 
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Fig. 4. The agreement cascade mechanism. Similarity between neighbors is measured as the 
correlation (phi coefficient) between the set of beliefs they hold. 
Returning to our 60-agent simulation, we can ask how patterns of similarity 
evolve at the macro level. In this simulation, we assume that adoption is permanent, 
and so diffusion raises the average similarity of the population purely by chance. This is 
especially true in the first round of simulation when neighbors have had a chance to 
exchange beliefs, but those beliefs have not yet spread through the population. Fig. 5A 
shows that agreement cascades drive individuals who already share some beliefs to 
form increasingly self-similar “camps”, and amplify the differences between camps.  
A simple and reproducible way to assess the similarity of individuals within an 
ideological camp – absent exogenous labels such as demographic or party – is to 
measure the similarity between all pairs of individuals and define a certain percentile as 
belonging to the same ideological camp. The more exclusive we are (i.e. the higher the 
percentile), the more conservative the claim that these represent “within-camp” 
relationships. Similarly, to define across-camp similarity, we can define a percentile that 
(conservatively) represents relationships between individuals in different ideological 
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camps. In this simulation, I use the 95th and 5th percentiles respectively. See the 
Methods section for more details6. 
 
 
Figure 5: The effect of agreement cascades on emergent polarization 
As individuals become more similar to people within their own camp and more 
differentiated from people in other camps, correlation begins to emerge between belief 
sets. For example, AB may co-occur with CD 70% of the time, but co-occur with DE 
only 10% of the time. This sorting is a form of dimensionality reduction, in which the 
complex landscape of beliefs becomes condensed into a few axes (e.g. liberal-
conservative, or libertarian-populist) (26). The upper inset diagram in Fig. 5B illustrates 
                                                        
6 There are many complex measures of polarization in the literature (14, 15, 17, 26-32 for a sample), which generally 
attempt to represent three basic intuitions. First, that individuals within the same ideological camp come to be more 
similar to one another. Secondly, that individuals in different ideological camps become more dissimilar to one 
another. Lastly, that an individual’s position on one dimension of belief becomes informative of their position on other 
dimensions. As my purpose is not to identify camps and their members, but to suggest that one set of conditions is 
more generative of polarization than another, these measures add more complexity than value. Instead I report 
heuristic measures characterizing the above three intuitions. 
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individuals who exchange interdependent beliefs and begin to take positions along a 
left-right axis. Differences between these individuals are mostly due to their relative 
positions along the left-right axis, and individuals at any point on the axis are relatively 
similar to one another. The lower inset diagram illustrates individuals who have 
exchanged independent beliefs with one another. In this diagram, there is less 
alignment along the left-right axis and more variation between individuals at any given 
point.  
Fig. 5B measures belief alignment as the amount of variation between individuals 
that can be explained by the best fitting axis in the space of possible beliefs (see the 
Methods section for details). While some difference from the homogeneous initial state 
is an inevitable result of diffusion, the effect of agreement cascades is to increase the 
ease with which individuals’ beliefs can be summarized by their position on a “political 
spectrum”. As a result, it becomes easier to predict an individual’s position on one belief 
from their position on other beliefs. 
A Laboratory Experiment 
 The above simulation describes mechanisms that emerge when beliefs interact, 
and makes specific, testable predictions about the effect of interdependence on 
diffusion. However, all such simulations deliberately simplify human behavior to explain 
the sociological mechanisms in play, and may mischaracterize behavior in important 
ways. To test whether these mechanisms and predictions hold with real human actors 
and realistic beliefs, I conducted a randomized controlled experiment with 2400 
participants in 120 artificial social networks. I systematically varied the level of 
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interaction between beliefs in otherwise identical populations, and measured emergent 
polarization in individuals’ behavior and self-reported beliefs. 
Over the course of 8 days, I recruited 2768 U.S. and Canadian Mechanical Turk 
workers, of whom 2400 completed training and were randomized into 20-person social 
networks7. Each network was assigned to one of four (matched) experimental 
conditions, each with n=30 samples. The participant population was 45% female; mean 
37.1 years old; 27% high-school, 49% bachelors, 16% masters+ graduates. 96.8% of 
players who completed training went on to complete all steps of the experiment, with 
less than 0.4% difference in dropout between conditions. The preregistration for this 
experiment8 included all code necessary to generate test conditions, implement the 
game using Empirica (33), conduct the experiment, and process the resulting data. 
Anonymized timestamped data for every player action is available for further analysis9.  
In this experiment, participants were asked to find a solution to a mystery by 
identifying a burglar's name, description, clothing, burglary tool, and getaway vehicle. 
Participants were seeded with four clues to the mystery, and incentivized to sort those 
clues into "Promising Leads" and "Dead Ends", as shown in Fig. 6.  When a participant 
categorized a clue as a promising lead, it was immediately shared with their three 
neighbors in the 20-person social network.  
The measures of polarization described in the above simulation were 
operationalized to reflect participants’ behavior, and also their self-reported opinions.  
                                                        
7 This sample size was chosen primarily to satisfy budget constraints. 
8 The preregistration can be found at https://osf.io/239ns 
9 Experiment data can be found at https://github.com/JamesPHoughton/detective-game-interdependent-diffusion 
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“Behavioral” measures were constructed from each player’s final categorization of 22 
clues, reflecting the cumulative choices that they had made throughout the game. 
Following the game, participants estimated the likelihood that each suspect, vehicle, 
etc. was involved in the crime. “Self-report” measures were constructed from these 11-
item assessments, reflecting how participants internalized the information they 
encountered to create opinions. Finally, participants were asked to rate their confidence 
in their overall solution, and the level of consensus they perceived in their team. The 
“Gameplay” section of the supplement recounts the participants’ full experience. 
 
Fig. 6. The primary user interface of the “Detective Game”. Clue cards can be dragged into 
categories in the player’s “Notebook”. Promising Leads are immediately shared with three 
neighbors, who can drag them into their own notebooks. 
 
In the theory-building simulations above, agents can be programmed to pay 
attention to interactions between beliefs in an “interdependent” world, and ignore those 
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interactions in an identical “independent” world. Human beings, on the other hand, are 
wired to see connections and relationships between ideas, and so it is impossible to 
conduct a perfect test in which all clues interact in one experimental condition, while 
none of those clues interact in another. Instead, I partitioned the clues such that some 
were common to both independent and interdependent conditions and used for analysis 
(i.e. “analysis clues”), while others varied across conditions to manipulate the level of 
interaction between analysis clues. In each game, 22 analysis clues linked the crime 
scene and stolen object to each of the suspects, descriptions, clothes, tools, and 
vehicles, as illustrated in Fig. 7a. In the interdependent condition, 55 additional “cross-
linking clues” connected all of these elements of the mystery (i.e. suspects, vehicles, 
etc.) to one another (Fig. 7b). In the independent condition, 55 “filler clues” took the 
place of cross-linking clues to break the relationships between elements (Fig. 7c). 
These filler clues ensured that the two conditions had the same total number of clues, 
and that the structure of clues was as similar as possible between conditions. 
Clues were extensively pre-tested to minimize bias from the outside world, such 
that each element was perceived to be equally likely to be involved in a burglary absent 
other information. Sets of clues were then randomly generated from the pool of 
pretested concepts, representing over 225 billion possible mysteries. At the start of the 
game, each clue was present in exactly one player’s notebook. As a result, beliefs 
spread on a level playing field, such that a priori none should be expected to diffuse 
more than any other. Further information can be found in the “Clue Generation” section 
of the supplement.  
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Fig. 7: Clues are designed such that in the interdependent condition, “analysis” clues are 
connected to one another by cross-linking clues; while in the independent condition, analysis 
clues remain disconnected from one another. 
 
In addition to the two types of clue structures, the experiment also included two 
types of social networks, in both of which 20 players were connected to exactly three 
neighbors each. The first network was a “dodecahedral” network (Fig. 8a), in which 
none of a player’s neighbors were directly connected to any other, and the average 
network distance between individuals was short. We should expect to find very little 
polarization in this network, as information can diffuse across the network readily, and 
coordination among subgroups is impeded by the lack of mutual connections. The 
second social network was a “regular connected caveman” structure (Fig. 8b), which 
exhibits high levels of clustering and large average distances between individuals. We 
 22 
 
should expect to find high levels of polarization in this network regardless of the level of 
interaction between clues, as strong clustering makes it easy for subgroups to converge 
on a shared set of clues, and long average path lengths make it harder for information 
to spread between camps. Further information can be found in the “Social Network 
Structure” section of the supplement.  
 
 
Fig 8. Participants inhabit 20-node regular degree-3 networks chosen to (A) minimize 
characteristic path length and clustering, and (B) maximize these attributes. 
 
Together these manipulations create four separate conditions. The dodecahedral 
network and independent clue set formed a baseline condition. Contrasted with the 
baseline, experimental conditions measured the effect of interdependence, the effect of 
social network structure, and the effect of both manipulations combined. Blocks of four 
simultaneous games were constructed with one game in each condition. To guard 
against latent external biases, each block used a different randomly-generated set of 
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clues. Clue assignments varied as little as possible within each block, such that the 
clues assigned to a particular network position in one game corresponded to those 
assigned to the same network position in the other three games. Upon completing 
training, participants were randomly assigned to positions within a block, blind to their 
treatment condition. I treated games within each block as matched samples, using one-
sided pairwise t-tests to assess the differences between each experimental condition 
and the baseline. 
Experimental Results 
Over eight minutes of gameplay, participants on average made 28.4 
classifications and adopted 16.2 clues as promising leads. Even though there were no 
solutions to the given mysteries, and clues were perfectly symmetric and seeded 
equally in the population, participants came to strongly-held beliefs about which suspect 
was guilty and how they performed the crime. For example, the average difference in 
confidence between the most and least likely suspect, vehicle, tool, etc. was over 30% 
in each category, and over half of participants reported confidence in at least one 
aspect of the mystery of 95% or greater.  
The baseline condition included independent clues diffusing through the non-
polarizing dodecahedral social network. This condition approximates the conditions of 
independent diffusion assumed broadly in the social contagion literature. However, 
despite the level of control afforded by a laboratory experiment, this condition does not 
perfectly eliminate all interactions between clues. For example, even though the 
independent clue set contains no explicit links between suspects, participants may draw 
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an implicit connection between the guilt of one suspect and the presumed innocence of 
another. This imperfect control means that measured differences between independent 
and interdependent conditions will underestimate the true effect of belief interaction. 
Finding 1: Interdependent diffusion has a measurable polarizing influence 
The first finding of this experiment confirms the theoretical prediction that 
interdependence between diffusants has a previously unobserved polarizing influence 
on the population’s adoption behavior. Increasing the level of interdependence between 
clues above the baseline condition (all else held constant) measurably increased the 
population’s alignment along a left-right axis among both behavioral (+2.16% p=.013) 
and self-reported (+2.77% p=.022) measures of belief (Table 1 and Fig. 9). Although not 
all similarity measures were significant, experimental results support the prediction that 
camps became more self-similar (behavioral measures +.0249, p=.014) and more 
distinct from one another (self-report measures p=.058) as a result of interdependence. 
The above theory does not predict how individuals will feel about their team’s 
performance. Interdependence did not change the perceived consensus among the 
team by any measurable amount, despite the increase in polarization. However, 
participants in the interdependent condition did report feeling more confident in their 
solution (+2.17% p=.045).  
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Finding 2: The effect of interdependence is of meaningful size   
The second finding is that the measured effect of interdependence is large 
enough to be worth attention when compared to other drivers of polarization. While we 
should be wary of generalizing macro-scale effect sizes from lab experiments to large- 
scale social networks, we can meaningfully compare the effect of interdependent 
diffusion with the more familiar effect of social network structure. An a fortiori test is to 
compare the measured effect of interdependence with the maximal effect that can be 
induced by changing the social network structure alone. If the effect of interdependence 
is relevant compared to that of drastic changes to the network structure, then it should 
also be relevant when compared with more moderate effects of network structure in the  
real world.  
 
Table 1. Effect and interaction summary 
  Effect over baseline condition Interaction of 
Interdependence 
and Network 
Effects 
  Interdependent 
Clues Alone 
Polarizing 
Network 
Alone 
Interdependent 
Clues and 
Polarizing Network 
Within-Camp 
Similarity 
(95th percentile 
correlation) 
Behavioral1 +0.0249** +0.155*** +0.158*** -.0227 
Self-Report1 -0.00389 +.0231 +.0357*** +.0183 
Across-Camp 
Similarity 
(5th percentile 
correlation) 
Behavioral1 +0.0112 -.0307*** -.0310*** -.00827 
Self-Report1 -0.0345* -.0904*** -.0844*** +.0402 
Alignment with 
Political Axis 
(% Variance in 1st 
Component) 
Behavioral1 +2.16%** +13.8%*** +14.2%*** -1.79% 
Self-Report1 +2.77%** +7.16%*** +5.34%*** -4.57%** 
Confidence Self-Report +2.17%** +0.682% +3.74%** +.887% 
Consensus Self-Report -0.624% +1.75%* +1.03% -.0925% 
1 Preregistered; *P value <.1, **P value <.05, ***P value <.01; one-sided pairwise T-tests; n=30 pairs; 
Baseline: Independent clues and non-polarizing social network.  
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The two networks included in this experiment exhibit dramatically different levels 
of network clustering and average path length. However, regardless of the strength of 
the social network manipulation, the effect of interdependent diffusion was only 
significantly different from the effect of social network structure in two of the six outcome 
measures: the behavioral measures of alignment along a left-right axis and within-camp 
similarity. At the same time, the estimated effect of interdependence reached 
approximately 40% of the a fortiori social network effect for the behavioral measures of 
across-camp similarity and alignment along a left-right axis. Other measures reported 
smaller but still meaningful fractions (Table 1 and Fig. 9).  
Again, these should not be taken as estimates of the effect size we would expect 
to see outside of the lab. However, the fact that the effects of interdependence and 
social network structure were even comparable in this experiment suggests that 
scholars’ almost exclusive focus on network structure over belief interaction is out of 
proportion to the relative importance of the two effects. 
Finding 3: A negative interaction effect may exist between interdependent diffusion and 
social network structure 
 A practical question is whether and how polarization can be reduced. Based 
upon the prior literature, a reasonable strategy would be to shorten the average 
distance between individuals and break up clusters, to help information travel across the 
network before camps consolidate. If there is no interaction (or a positive interaction) 
between the effects of interdependence and network structure, these changes to social 
network structure would be at least as powerful when beliefs interdepend as they are 
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when beliefs spread on their own. However, if there is a negative interaction between 
interdependence and network structure, then these interventions will not be as effective 
as we might expect. 
The final condition of this experiment measured the effect of interdependent 
diffusion in the polarizing social network. While statistical power was poor, this condition 
revealed a significant negative interaction effect for alignment with a political axis based 
on self-reported beliefs (-4.57% p=.033). It is unclear whether the interaction arises 
because the two factors operate through similar pathways, or because the outcome 
variable begins to saturate. However, it is clear that even if we had perfect control of 
social network structure, we could not fully address polarization without attending to 
belief interaction. 
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Fig. 9. Interdependent diffusion has a measurable polarizing effect over a baseline condition of 
independent clues in a non-polarizing social network. The effect size is an unignorable fraction 
of that of the a fortiori social network manipulation. A negative interaction effect may exist 
between interdependence and social network structure. (Error bars show 95% CI). 
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Discussion: 
When multiple interrelated beliefs are regularly found together (1, 15, 26, 30), it is 
easy to suppose that they constitute internally-consistent worldviews that represent 
some underlying truth about the world. Through both simulation and experiment, this 
paper demonstrates that external “truth” need not be present for these worldviews to 
emerge. Individuals may observe internal consistency between their beliefs and social 
confirmation of their choices entirely as a product of interdependent diffusion. It is 
perhaps alarming that this can be observed in an experiment premised on a designed 
lack of evidence for any conclusion, in which participants interacted with the presented 
information for only eight minutes.  
Implicit in the above supposition is the idea that observed worldviews represent 
natural groupings of beliefs (right or wrong), and that different groupings could not have 
become popular. Instead, this paper shows that worldviews can emerge in a path-
dependent way that could have led different worldviews to emerge in the same 
environment.  
It is not surprising to see polarization develop when a social network is formed 
from relatively isolated communities (8, 15), or to see polarization grow when individuals 
choose to associate with people like themselves (27). What is surprising is that when 
beliefs interact, polarization emerges even in a static, symmetric, and well-connected 
social network whose members are anonymous, have no desire to form groups, have 
no predefined issues to disagree over, have no incentive to ‘perform’ for their neighbors, 
and indeed have very little emotional connection with the beliefs they are sharing. It 
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turns out that none of our habitual explanations for polarization are strictly necessary; 
interdependent diffusion is sufficient.  
Of the many difficulties in creating this experiment, the most complex was to 
design a nontrivial set of “independent” beliefs for participants to exchange. Despite 
many rounds of structured pretesting with hundreds of participants, in the end, the 
“control” condition of this experiment can only approximate conditions of independence 
for a subset of the diffusants. The real-world relevance of interdependent diffusion could 
not be better emphasized than by the difficulty of recreating the almost-ubiquitous 
assumption of independence between diffusants even in ideal laboratory conditions. It 
may well be that rather than assuming independence between diffusants, we ought to 
consider simultaneously spreading beliefs to be interdependent until proven otherwise. 
It is certainly the case that when scholars assume independence between diffusants, 
that assumption should be noted and challenged. 
While this paper demonstrates the relevance of belief interaction for polarization 
and worldview emergence, it is by no means an exhaustive study of the consequences 
of interdependent diffusion. As the literature expands to include more studies of belief 
interaction, further effects will certainly be discovered and their practical implications 
recognized. Rather than closing the book, I hope that this paper opens a new chapter in 
the study of interdependent diffusion. 
Several weeks after the Charleston Shooting, the South Carolina state legislature 
finally approved a bill to remove the Confederate flag from the State House grounds. 
Why was the Charleston shooting the incident that spurred this change, while other 
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instances of racial violence throughout history had not had the same effect? The 
removal of the flag was not a new issue, nor an inevitable outcome (1, 34). The 
legislators did not adopt the belief that the flag should be removed because they were 
newly exposed to it, but because they first adopted a series of facilitating beliefs 
regarding the flag, racial violence, symbols of oppression, and the preferences of their 
constituency. These influences cannot be reduced to simple contagion of independent 
diffusants; they depend entirely upon the interaction of interdependent, simultaneously 
diffusing beliefs.  
 
Methods: 
In the simulation presented in Figs. 3 and 5, the social network is a connected 
Erdős–Rényi (Gnm) random graph with 60 agents total, each with an average of 3 
neighbors. Each agent is initialized with 25 beliefs (edges) selected randomly from the 
300 edges available in a complete semantic network with 25 concepts (nodes). These 
values ensure good coverage of beliefs in the population, while individual semantic 
networks are initially sparse. Random seeding ensures that the simulation starts without 
polarization or systematic variation in belief popularity, and also that the social network 
structure itself does not contribute to polarization. Because beliefs are drawn from a 
complete semantic network, there is no natural belief structure around which 
polarization may nucleate.  
In each step, individuals are selected in random order, and update their beliefs 
by incorporating into their semantic networks all beliefs (edges) that their neighbors 
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possess and they are susceptible to adopting. In the interdependent case, individuals 
are susceptible to any belief that closes a triangle in their semantic networks at the 
current time. In the comparison (independent) case for Fig 3A, a random selection of 
the population is defined to be susceptible to each belief in the same proportion as are 
initially susceptible to the belief in the interdependent diffusion case. In Figs 3B-D and 
Fig 5, a random selection of susceptible individuals is made in proportion to the final 
number of susceptible individuals in the interdependent diffusion case. As a result, a 
histogram of the extent of diffusion of each belief is approximately the same under both 
independent and interdependent treatments. This ensures that the subsequent 
presentation of results reflects purely the effect of interdependence between diffusants, 
and not the effect of different levels of adoption in the compared populations. Results 
are similar when calculated based upon the initial susceptibility.  
The measures presented Figs. 3A-C are averaged over all beliefs in the 
simulation, and over 20,000 simulations. The measures in Figs. 3D and 5 are 
population-level measures averaged over 20,000 simulations. This volume of 
simulations is an order of magnitude beyond the point at which noise affects the result. 
The measure of the susceptible population in Fig. 3A (and all discussion of the 
susceptible population) represents all individuals who would adopt the belief if exposed 
to it, along with all of the individuals who have already adopted the belief. I break from 
the traditional compartmental model description of susceptibility and adoption/infection 
as mutually exclusive categories to more effectively demonstrate the coevolution of 
susceptibility and adoption. Using traditional definitions does not change the outcome of 
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the simulation. Fig. 3B measures the correlation between new adoption and those who 
are initially susceptible to the belief but do not start with it. As this has no meaningful 
value at t0, the curve is drawn from t1-t9. Figure 3D uses the clustering coefficient of a 
semantic network constructed from the most popular 10% of beliefs as a demonstration 
that the most popular beliefs are mutually interrelated, and not merely all related to a 
single leading belief (e.g. a star or barbell pattern). Clustering only makes sense when 
beliefs are conceptualized as a semantic network. Other conceptualizations of belief 
interaction might prefer to plot the number of top decile beliefs that each top decile 
belief interacts with. This measure gives essentially the same result (i.e. large fractional 
growth over time in the interdependent case, with no change from randomness in the 
independent case) but lacks the depth of meaning captured by the clustering metric. 
The measure is generally insensitive to the specific threshold used to define a ‘popular’ 
belief for any thresholds between about 5% and 40%. Fig. 5B shows the percentage of 
variation explained by the first principal component of the data. The original feature 
space has one dimension for each belief in the simulation (300), and points 
representing each individual’s position in that feature space (60) according to the beliefs 
they have adopted. The inset graphs are exaggerated and show a larger population to 
illustrate how a component can explain more or less variation. For all remaining 
parameters in the simulation, other (meaningful) values and measures yield qualitatively 
similar results. For a full sensitivity analysis and code, see 
https://github.com/JamesPHoughton/interdependent-diffusion. 
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 There are many ways to measure the similarity between individuals. The “self-
reported” beliefs of experiment participants fall on a continuous scale from 0 to 100, and 
so it is natural to use Pearson’s correlation on the vectors of individuals’ beliefs. This 
measure has the advantage of being easily interpretable and having a well-defined 
range that is independent of the number of features in the vector of attributes being 
compared, and the negative region of which can be interpreted as expressing 
dissimilarity. To assess the similarity of the binary “behavioral” data I use the Phi 
coefficient, an analogous measure to Pearson’s correlation with the same interpretable 
range. The behavioral measures in the experiment are sensitive not only to 
interdependence and network structure but also to the average level of diffusion of 
beliefs. To minimize noise due to differences in the level of activity between games, 
each of the behavioral measures is assessed compared to what would be expected due 
to chance, keeping the number of adopters of each clue and the number of clues 
adopted by each participant fixed. All code for conducting the experiment and analyzing 
results, along with the results of the experiment, are available at 
https://github.com/JamesPHoughton/detective-game-interdependent-diffusion. 
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